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CHAPl'ER I
THE ORIGDlS OF SANTAYANA'S TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIhLISM

While it is true that the influence of hereditary and
environmental

fact~rs

on a man's philosophy can be overem-

phasized, it is only natural to believe that these factors are
of some account in the molding of his thought.

This is defi-

nitely the case in the philosophy of George Santayana.

Indeed,

Santayana himself characterizes his philosophy as a synthesis
of Spanish and American traditions. l Traditions in their
original and vital expression are oral.

It will be ot

ad~n

tage, .then, to study in detail the men with whom the young
Santayana came in contact at Harvard, because there, in the
dynamio interplay of intelle cts, Santayana's supple mind was
steeped in akaleidoscopio philosophical tradition, to which
each professor contributed his own hue.

During his own teach-

ing years at Harvard, Santayana transmitted this same tradi-

.

tion, flecked with the ideas of his masters, but suffused with
the fresh light of his own thought.

And finally, since philo-

sophical content and presentation are

circum~cribed

by the

author's purpose in philosophizing and his attitude towards
philosophy, an understanding of these factors will prove an
1 Paul A. Schilpp (Editor) I The Philosophy of George Santa~, The Library of LivlDg PhIlosophers series, North~ern University, Evanston and Chicago, II, 1940, 3.
1

2

invalua ble source for a c17stal-clear comprehension of, and
sympathy for, Santayana's philosophy.
George Santayana was born in Madrid on the sixteenth of
December t eighteen hundred and sixty-three. His father had
spent many years as a government o1'1'icial in the Philippines.
Mrs. Santayana, who had previously married Nathaniel SturgiS,
an American merchant resident in Manila, likewise had a Philippine background, since her father had also been employed in
the Spanish service.

Consequently it is not surprising that

Santayana has lived 1'ram childhood, as he tells us, in the
imaginative presence of interminable ocean spaces and coconut
islands. 2 During the years this child's imagination was to
know an unusual development; and the importance of the role
of this faculty in Santayana's philosophy ought to be grasped
at the very beginning of this thesis, since it will run
through this paperllke a fugue.

For Santayana, metaphysics

is an excursus of the mind over the faots of fanoy;3 and the
imagination is the great unifier of humanity.4
What are some of those influences which molded the contour
2 Schilpp, 4.
3 George Santayana, The Realm. of Spirit, Chas. Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1940, 274.
4 George Santayana, Inte1retation of Poetry and Religion,
Chas. Soribner's Sons, ew York, 1900, 9.

..
3

of this child's imagination?

One of the chief was his.mother,

a cool, stoical woman, as her son recalls her, who disdained
the corruption about her. 5 Did her son inherit any of his
mother's aloofness?

Perhaps, for Will Durant focuses upon

this point in his critique of Santayana, with the result that
he characterizes him as a Spanish grandee who views our little
systems with UDwondering and superior eye. 6 While aloofness
would not necessarily be an inherited characteristic, the power
of example is considerable.

Add to this the fact that as a

child Santayana was brought to America to be educated with his
Sturgis relatives.

Undoubtedly the problem of adjustment was

a severe trial to his sensitive soul.

Is it surprising that

the lonely boy withdrew into himself to live in his own dreamworld?
Traces of these early influences are to be found in Santayana's philosophy.

It is an other-worldly philosophy, the

philosophy of a man without a country, since he became alienated from. Spain,7 and, as :Mr. Durant observes: "1},is soul,
softened with much learning, and sensitive as a poet's souT
must be (for he was poet first, and philosopher afterward),
suffered fram the noisy baste of American city-1ife. ne His
5 Schilpp, 4.
6 Will Durant, The StOry of PhilOSOph!, Garden City Publishing Co., Garden CIty, New York, 19~, 367.
7 Schilpp, 7.
.
8 Durant, 366.

4

philosoph7 is that of the lover of peaoe and solitude who is
•

buffeted about b7 a oruel world, and seeks, therefore, peaoe
and freedom of spirit in a realm beyond the reaohes of harsh,
oomplex material existenoe.

The philosophical expression of

this storm-tossed spirit is, as a oonsequenoe, tinged with
melanoholy:
••• it is a veraoious and fearless selfexpression; here a mature and subtle
though too sombre, soul has written Itself
down quietly, in statuesque and olassio
prose. And though we may not like its
minor key, its undertone of sweet regret
for a vanished world, we see in it the
finished expression of this dying and
nasoent age, in whioh men oannot be altogether wise and free. 9
Fina1l7, there is one more home-influenoe to be mentioned,
the religious influenoe.

Like his parents before him, Santa-

yana oonsiders himself, nominally at least, a Catholic.

But a

better expression of his religious creed oan be found in his
statement: "Religions are the great fairy-tales of the consoienoe."lO Indeed, it is most difficult to reoonoile his
searoh for peace and enlightenment of spirit with his espousal
of the darkness of disillusion.

Yet he has chosen the latter:

For my own part, I was quite sure that
life was not worth living; for if religion was false everything was worthless,
and almost everything, if religion was
true. • • I saw the same alternative between Catholicism and complete disillu9 Durant, 380-381.
10 Schilpp, 8.

p
5

Of

sion: but I was never afraid
lusion, and I have chosen it.~

•

disil-

, santayana graduated with the bachelor's degree from Harvard in 1882.

The graduate's life-time spanned a period in

which rationalism and materialism were in the ascendency.
The decades or the seventies and eighties
were the very pilmacle of rationalism and.
materialism, before the reaction of the
nineties set in. They were the decades
of Huxley and Leslie Stephen in England! .
of Ta1ne and Renan in France, or Haecke
and DUhring in Germany, ,of the Forta1f,tly Review', the Nineteenth Century, an1he
Revue des Deux Mondes • At Harvard,
Charles ElIot Norton, more than the professors of philosophy, was imbued with
this Zeitg:ist... Now Santayana, for all
his detac ent, kept abreast of the times
and could not help absorbing much ot this
scientific and sceptical spirit. 12
I

Still, Santayana claims to be outside the watershed of nineteenth century philosophical thought. 13 But the reader of
The Life of Reason will find that it breathes the very spirit
of nineteenth century rationalism. 14 Without doubt Santayana,
in claiming to be divorced fram the thought of his day, has
overlooked the very decided, although unconscious, influence
of various writings in molding his general mentality.

11
12

Ibid., 7-8.

G.W~Howgate,

George Santayana, (A dissertation) University
of Penn. Press, philadelphia, 1938, 25-26.
13 Schilpp, 12.
14 Cf. Hawgate, 132-133.

6

Santayana admits that d:uring his undergraduate data he
oame under the spell of William James and Josiah Royoe, the
free-thought leaders of the times, for whom, however, he says
he had more wonder than agreement. l5 He believes that as a
novioe-philosopher he was more attraoted by the teaohings of
Royoe than those of James. l6 Royoe, the leader of the voluntaristic wing of the Post-Hegelian Idealists, was more akin to
Fiohte than to the other members of that sohool. His philosophy presents a synthesis of elements gathered from. different
sohools: an a-priori metaphysios, a touoh of British empiricism,
ooupled with Hegelian monism. and pantheism, and blended with
Amerioan individualism and moral dualism. l7
What influenoe did suoh a philosopher have on Santayana?
It was from Royoe that he oulled his relative morality.
yana

Santa-

that his soholastio logio tempted him to reduoe
Royoe to a solipsist. 18 Yet Royce was no mean dialectitian
oonfess~s

himself.

A.s an idealist of the general Hegelian type, he

neoessarily relied on his dialeotioal acumen; and through this
faoility, states'Santayana, he opened vistas to his students,
and disturbed Santayana's too easy dogmatism.. l9
15 Sohi1pp, 8.
16 Ibid., 10.
.
17 D .Malone (Editor), The Diotionary of Amerioan Biography,
Chas. Soribner's Sons, New York, 1943, XVI, 20'.
18 Sohi1pp, 8.
19 George Santayana, Persons and Places: The BaC~round ot
My Life, Chas. Soribner's Sons,-New York, 194~ 244.

,
Although Santayana olaims that he remembers more Of James'
l1l8.D.Ilerisms tban his ~eaohings, 20 his empirioism testit'ies to
the effioacy of James' influenoe.

The empiricism of the master

eohoes in Santayana's theory of knowledge.

Their oorrespond-

enoe manifests the sympathy of James for his pupU' s empiricism, but not for his Platonism.

To James' radioa1 empirioism,

together with Berkeleyts nominalism, Santayana attributes the
oredit of leading him to the realm ot essence. 21 It was James
again, not so muoh in his aotua1 teaching, but rather in the
spirit and background of that teaohing, who gave to the young
Santayana his idea ot the utterly irrational nature ot existence: "the unadulterated, unexplained, instant faot ot experience."22
But for the later teaohings ot his former master, Santayana

lost all sympathy.

In his more mature years James tried

to make his philosophy a philosophy ot reality.
He suggested a new physics or metaphysics
in which the essences given in immediate
eXperience should be deployed and hypostatized into the oonstitutents ot nature:
but this pictorial cosmology had the
disadvantage ot abolishing the human
imagination, with all the pathos and
poetry ot its animal status. James
20 Ibid., 241-242.
21 l'61'!'., 242 •
22 ECEI1pp, 15.

8

thus renounced the gift for literary
psychology, that romantic insight, in
which alone he excelled; and indeed his
followers are without it. I pride myself on remaining a disciple of his
earlier unsophisticated self, when he
was an agnostic about the universe, but
in his diagnosis of the heart an impulsive poet: a master in the art of recording or divining the lyric quality of experien~s as it actually came to him or
to me.

•

Clearly santayana rejects James' philosophy of reality on the
grounds of disloyalty to the imagination.
Another member of Harvard's philosophy department during
Santayana's undergraduate days was Professor Palmer.

Santa-

yana mentions little about Palmer: he merely says that he indicated to him the verbal cogency of dialectic and acquainted
him with the English Moralists. 24 Perhaps Santayana's affinity
to these Moralists can be traced to the lectures of Palmer.

In

Santayana can be found that same preference for the imagination,
and the corresponding diminution of the power of reason.

But

more probably the idea of a sentiment which is a determination
of human nature came to Santayana from Hume, whose environment
was charged with the teachings of the Moralists.

Professor

Palmer was gifted with a comprehensiveness of view and an in23 Ibid., 16-17.
24 persons and Places, 247.

9

tellectual sympathy, which enabled him to fire the imaginations of his students with sweeping panoramas, and bend· their
minds "to a suave and sympathetic participation in the views
of all philosophers in turn."25

Yet his "scholastic dogmatism"

disturbed the young Santayana, and coerced him to ask himself
what was true. 26
The works of previous philosophers were undoubtedly a
source of further inspiration to the young Santayana.

He re-

calls that
The only solid foundation for all my play
with this subject was supplied by the sturdy but undeveloped materialism of Hobbes,
powerfully supported by the psychology of
Spinoza and insecurely by the earlier medioal psychology of James: to which in Germany my passing ~~thusias.m for Schopenhauer may be added.
He discovered, he claims, the foundation for his philosophy in
several respects, notably as regards morality, in a careful
study of the "ipsissima verba" of Spinoza. 28 But to Fichte
and Schopenhauer must be ascribed the combination of those two
elements which are to be examined in this thesis, his transcendentalism and his materialism.

By showing Santayana that

he must oscillate between a radical transcendentalism and a
materialism, these earlier philosophers taught him, he main-

25 Schilpp, 9.
26 Ibid.
27 PerSons and Places, 248.
28

Ibid.,

243.

10
tains, the causes of knowing and becoming of immediate.experience. 29
For three years, while sharing the Walker Fellowship with
Charles A. strong, Santayana pursued his studies abroad, where
he lived under the aegis of Paulsen and Simmel in Berlin.
Simmel's materialistic interpretation of conduct was in line
with Santayana's own inclination; and his relativism, as Howgate remarks, "may have encouraged santayana to think of
ethics, history, religion, and even metaphysics as autonomous
creations, constructions of the mind, rather than as revelations of absolute fact.,,30

Paulsen was a panoramist like

Palmer, who expounded the "sweet-reasonableness" of the Greeks
to the eager Santayana with a considerably more telling effect
than did his American contemporary.

The harmony and balance

of Greek life and thought appealed to the poetic Santayana, an.d
from that time he found in the ancients the natural support and
point of attachment for his own philoSOphy.3l Long after his
Fellowship days had passed, Santayana spent a sabbatical year,
1896-1897, in England, where he read Plato and Aristotle under
Jackson.

He became convinced that the Pre-Socratic Greeks,

notably the Atomists, had reached orthodoxy in natural philos29 Schilpp, 17.
30 Howgate, 33.
31 Schilpp, 13.

11

ophy;,while he believed the Post-Sooratios to have att~ined
this same orthodoxy in morals. 52 This "orthodoxy" in two lines
of investigation is what has enhanoed Greek philosophy in
Santayana's eyes.
The Greeks in their sanity disoovered
not only the natural world but the art
of living well in it ••• The sentiments
and maxims, whilst very properly diverse, had all of them a certain noble
frankness in the presenoe of the infinite world, of which they begged no
favors. Nature was essentially understood and honestly described; and •••
for that very reason, the free mind
could disentangle its true good, and
could express it in art, in manners,
and even in the most refined or the
most austere spiritual discipline. 35
While in England, Santayana oontacted James' old friend,
Dr. Hodgson.

Regarding his former professor's friend,

Santayana is unoommunioative, but not so Professor James.
James quotes a favorite maxim of Hodgson's in his Prinoiples:
t~atever

you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the

planation of everything e1se."54

~x

To what extent Santayana

suocumbed to Hodgson's influence is difficult to discern.

The

two men are Significantly alike in regarding the immediate deliverance of consciousness as conSisting of essences, and not of
52 8ohilpp, 22.
35 George Santayana, SOlilOauies in England and Later 80lilo,uies, Chas. Soribner's ons, New York, 1922, 214.
541111am James, The Principles of PSychology, Henry Holt &
Co., New York, 1931, I, 347.

12

existence s. 35

•

It becomes clear to the reader of Santayana's philosophy
that, however much he admired the Greeks and intended to anchor his speculations on Greek thought, his attitude towards
philosophy is altogether different from that of his ancient
models.

Thales and the early Ionians were seeking in their

physics a "world-stuff," a material principle for the world
which they investigated.

The problem of change in this world

perplexed them, and contrary solutions to this difficulty were
proferred by Heraclitus and Parmenides.

The atomic theory of

Democritus and Leucippus likewise aimed at being a solution
to this problem in the real world.

Is Santayana's philosophy

a philosophy in the Greek sense of the term, an attempt to
explain reality?

Santayana eschews metaphysics, and contends

that his own system is metaphysical only in a literary
sense. 36 He views metaphysics as an attempt to establish
truths about nature and existence otherwise than by observation, measurement, and experiment. 37 His system is a system
of logical essences, and
35 R.P.Barton, The ThOught and Character of William James,
Little, Brown & do., Boston, 1935, I, 614.
36 ~irit, 274.
370rge SantaYana, "The Realm of Essence," in Realms of
Beins, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1942, 175.

p
15
essence, truth, and spirit are indeed
non-physical; but for-that very reason
they are not to be invoked at all in
physics or cosmology, which 4ea1s with
common sense facts---assumed to exist
by themse1ves---and studies their factual relations without pret~ding to
explain or understand them.

•

Unlike the philosophy of the Greeks, Santayana's is not a philosophy of reality.

A letter to James of December 18, 1887

shows that this was already his pOSition at that early date.
If philosophy were the attempt to solve
a given problem, I should see reason to
be discouraged about its success; but it
strikes me that it is rather an attempt
to express a half-undiscovered reality,
just as art is, and that two different
renderings, if they are expressive, far
from oanoelling each other add to each
other's value. The great bone of philosophy is the theological animus which
hurries a man toward final and intolBrant
truths as towards his salvation. Such
truths may be necessary to men but phi10,sophy can hardly furnish them. It can
only interpret nature, in parts with
accuracy, in parts only with a vague symbolism. I confess I do not see why we
should be so vehemently curious about the
absolute truth, Which is not to be made
or altered by our discovery of it. But
philosophy seems to me to be its own reward, and its justification lies in the
delight and dignity of the art itself. 59
It thus becomes more and more obvious to Santayana's
reader that the author intended no system, but merely took
38 George Santayana, A personal letter to the author, June 15,
1947. Cf. Appendix II.
39 Barton, 402.

p
40
delight in speculation for itself.
.

.

In fact, Santayana has

definite views on systems, seeing in them only a natural tendency to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinion. 41 His philosophy, he maintains, is not scientific.

It is a lay religion,42

for "the goal of speculative thinking is no other than to live
as much as may be in the eternal, and to absorb and be absorbed
in the truth."43

It is in this final expression of his atti-

tude toward philosophy that Santayana betrays not only his
affinity to the Indian philosophemof Nirvana and Brahma, but
also gives us complete justification for characterizing his
philosophy as other-worldly.
Nevertheless, Santayana claims to be a scholastic philosopher at heart,44 a scholastic in his principles, not in his
ways.45 Undoubtedly a scholastic philosopher would object to
this claim of relationship, and insist that his only kinship
with Santayana is a penchant for distinctions.
40 Persons and Places, 250.
41
G. iuelder and Laurence Sears (Editors), "The Genteel
Tradition in American Philosophy" by George Santayana,
179-190, The Development of American.Philosophy, Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston~1940, 184.
42 Spirit, 273~
43 George santayana! Reason in Cammon Sense, Chas. Scribner's
sons New York, 905, !8 •.
44 Schil pp, 604.
45 Ibid.

w.
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The task of summarizing the manifold sources of iutluence
on Santayana's philosophy is rendered difficult because his
philosophy seems to be a texture of his family history, the
philosophers he studied under, his health, his ideas on the
United states, Italy, Spain, wine, modern teaching methods,
the architectural teaching methods of Europe, flowers, and
diverse similar topics.

The dominant themes, however, in his

philosophy can be indicated: Platonism, materialism, and
scepticism, for his thought is
••• reminiscent equally of Greek idealism,
materialism and scepticism, of Indian,
neo-Platonic and medieval mysticism, of
medieval scholastic distinctions and modern psychology.45

45

Celestine J. Sullivan, Jr., "Santayana's Philosophical
Inheritance," Schilpp, 53-92, 55.

CHAPrER II
THE NATURE OF SANTAYANA'S TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIAJ3ISM

Santayana has tersely expressed his philosophical position
in a single 'sentence:
We must oscillate between a radical transcendentalism, frankly reduced to a solipsism of the living moment, and a materialism posited as a presupposition of oonventiona1 sanity.1
The logioa1 procedure is first to attain a olear understanding
of the significanoe which the terms "transcendentalism" and
"materialism" have for Santayana.

With this\ understanding it

remains to be seen whether a philosophy based on these two elements is sound and consistent.

This is the line of investiga-

tion to be taken in the following chapters.
The first thing to note about Santayana's radical transcendentalism is that it is not a pure transcendentalism, which
denies the existenoe of objective reality; and that the solipsism to which it is reduced is a solipsism only in the sense
that he does not know what this objective reality is, although
he knows that it is.

In The Realm of Essenoe Santayana affords

us a somewhat clearer notion of this solipsism of the living
moment.
Nothing is present to the spirit at any
1

Schi1pp, 17.
16

1'1

time but what is then present to it;
this cannot be in the least altered by
the tact that other things may have
been. present to it, or to other spirits,
at other times. 2
This passage seems to indicate merely that one knows what he
knOws, just the present atom of experience which is here and
noW before him, as Hume might say.

In this present experience

ot looking out ot the window, I know the tree which stands betore me.

The tact that I know it is sufficient; the

why ot knowing remain mysteries.

B2!

and

This interpretation seems

justitiab1e in the light of a section of The Realm ot Matter,
where Santayana treats of the two phases of transcendentalism:
the sceptical one of retreat to the immediate datum of experience, and the assertive one, by which the objects whioh are
posited by a transcendental faith are defined and marshalled
in such an order as intelligent action demands. 3 It is apparent that santayana uses the term "transoendental" in two different senses: first, in the sense of "idealistic," since the
immediate datum of experience, as subsequent observation will
reve&l, is an essence, an ideal or logical term; and second, in
the sense in which Kant speaks of a transcendental use of
knowledge; that is, knowledge in which the knowing subject
goes beyond itself to the

object which is the cause of its

2 Essence, 151.
3 George Santayana, "The Realm of Matter," in Realms of Being,
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1942, 200.

18
idea.

This act of transcendence is accomplished by thl "spir-

it," and Santayana says that this is the only transcendental
part of his system.. 4 In this thesis, however, "transcendental"
is used in the first sense, meaning "idealistic".
It oan readily be seen that "transcendental materialism"
is primarily concerned with the critical problem, since it is
intended by Santayana to bridge the gap between the knowing
subject and the thing known. 5 The spirit, the transoendental
function of the "psyche," is the knowing subject, which is provided with the data of experience in terms of essences, of logical entities.

Yet sanity tells Santayana that he eats things,

that he touches things, things 'outside of

h~selt;

and since

these things are tangible, visible, and edible, they are constituted of matter.

Wherefore, "matter is properly a name for

the actual substance of the natural world, whatever that substance may be."6

Now matter, in Santayana's eyes, is only a

presupposition of conventional sanity,7 since he does not know
these material things, 'but merely the essences Which symbolize
them.

It is the part of the natural SCiences, he frequently

reiterates,S to investigate these material facts; and Santayana
himself is not a physicist.

None the less he swears allegiance

4 Geo. Santayana, Letter to the author, Apr. 16, 1947, Cf.
A~pend-i:X: I.
5 e. Sch11pp, 17-18.
6 Matter, 332.
7 Sch11pp, 17.
8 Letter of dune 15, 1947.

19
to the atomic theory as the only possible physical

explana~

tion,9 and eulogizes Father Democritus as the possessor of "an
indefensible faith in a single radical insight, which happened
nevertheless to be true."lO
Santayana fS own "faith" must be further examined.

Not-

withstanding his innate hostility to dogmatism, in Scepticism
and Animal Faith he enunciates two fundamental dogmas: the
belief in himself, and in the existing world which action postulates. ll These two dogmas are of a piece with his aforementioned pre-supposition, materialism, in that both himself
and the existing world are reductively material.

Now a rigid

materialist has no right to speak of consciousness and other
psychic states; consequently Santayana can not be classified as
a strict materialist.

For him, matter is not the only reality

in the world, but it is the only substance, power and force in
the world. 12 This is an important fact to g~sp, and it finds
expression in any number of Santayana's works. 13 He is determined that matter alone must be the ultimate principle.

How

this matter can generate an immaterial spirit,

9 Matter, 231.
10 Irwin Edman, (Editor), The Philosophy of Santa~na, The Modern Library Edition, Random House, New York, ~2, 293.
11 Geo. Santayana, sce~ticism and Animal Faith, Chas.Scribner's
Sons, New York, 192 , 243. ct. "The Realm of Truth" in
Realms of Being, 457.
12 Scliilpp, 509.
13 Cf.Matter, 234-235, 328; and Geo. Santayana, The Realm of
Spirit, 186, 196.
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a moral stress of varying scope and intensity, full of will and selectiveness,
arising in animal bodies, and raising
their private vicissitudes into a moral
experience ,14

•

is a problem even for Santayana, who rests content to note it
as a brute fact. 15

One wisnes for a solution to this problem,

for it is the basis of his apparently paradoxical stand as an
idealistic materialist.
Mind owes its origin, growth, and development to matter, but the strange
child repays his parent a hundredfold
with the riches he pours in her lap.
Nature gives birth to consciousness;
consciousness gives value to nature. 16
In The Realm of. Matter Santayana indicates how a materialist
might be a true idealist, by preferring the study of essence to
that of matter. 17 Yet Santayana's materialism has been devised
to keep his poetic ecstasies in their proper place.

Does not

this materialism seem inadequate to the task, since it must
fall back on the extraordinary to account for mind and spirit?
It is disconcerting to the reader of Santayana when he
begins to understand that this materialism rests on a belief. 18
The dominance of matter in every existing being, even when that being is spiritual, is the great axiom of materialism,
14 Spirit, VIII.
15 SchIlpp, 17.
16 Howgate, 110.
17 Matter, 382.
18 Truth, 453.
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to which this book is only a corollary.19
This materialism, or naturalism as he sometimes calls it, is an
assumption,20 not an academic opinion, but an everyday conviction2l in which he has always believed. 22

Mr. Howgate (who, it may be said in passing, though he
recognizes many inadequacies in Santayana's explanations,
shares none of his sympathy for Catholicism or Scholasticism)
remarks that Santayana's dogmatism enables him "to march boldly
and consistently through an undergrowth of metaphysiCS which
might entrap the more circum~pect philosopher."23 A closer
analysis of Santayana's philosophy reveals the truth of this
statement, but not quite as Mr. Howgate intended it.

Philoso-

phy, in the general acceptation of the ter.m, is a science of
causes.

Since Santayana has rejected a theory of causality, he

has developed a philosophy of description, pe~sonal and subjec~
tive. 24 Confronted by the "brute fact"25 of materialism, he
can penetrate no further.
The question naturally arises: is he justified in accept19
20
21
22
23
24

Matter, 292.
Spirit, 174.
sChllpp, 12.
Howgate, 239.
Ibid., 110.

~Schilpp,

605. This personal element is best seen in
Santayana's dealing with his adversaries.
25 Schilpp, 504-505.
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ing this "brute fact," and is it as brutal as he makes

~t?

Santayana has sufficient justification for this supposition if
matter, as the only power and foroe in the universe, is capable
of explaining the essential difference between living and nonliving beings, between animals and men.

But what philosophioal

evidenoe does Santayana offer for suoh a position?

He has

olaimed that his materialism is the oonviotion of his "experience and observation of the world at large."26
ience should indioate to

h~

But his exper-

an essential elevation of man over

the brute, manifested in the power to speak, to generalize, and
to make progress.

And yet oommonly he uses the generic term

"animal" to designate animals and men,27 implying that there is
no fundamental difference.

In fine, he believes that man sur-

passes inanimate oreation only because external ciroumstanoes
have been more favorable to him.
Aocordingly the analogy of nature would
suggest that the other living oreatures
in the world are animate too and disoourse privately no less assidUOUSly and
absurdly than I do. It would even suggest that all the su.stanoe of nature is
ready to think, if oircumstances allow
by presenting something to think about,
and-creating the appropriate organ ••• a
stone will think like me, in so far as
it lives like me.28
But this passage ought to be read side by side with his address,

26

Ibid., 12.
Matter, 233.
28 SceptIcism and Animal Faith, 250.
27

23

The Genteel Tradition in Amerioan Philosophy.

A sharp.oontrast

is presented.
By their mind, its soope, quality, and
temper, we ~stimate men, for by the mind
only do we exist as men, and are more
than so many storage-batteries for material energy. Let us therefore be frankly
human A9 Let us be oontent to live in the

mind.~

It seems that the idealist has forsaken his materialism.
Santayana is oognizant of the objection that matter of itself can not explain life.

His response to this diffioulty is,

incidentally, illustrative of his passion for subtle distinctions.

He points out that when a man says: "Matter can not ex-

plain the origin of life, of oonsoiousness, or of morals," he
means his own idea of matter.

Sinoe a man's idea of matter is,

in Santayana's terminology, an essenoe, then Santayana heartily
agrees with

h~,

because no essence can be the origin of any-

thing, either of another essence or of any faot.

But real

matter, says Santayana, is a hidden power, and its capaoities
are unknown to the mind of man.

Accordingly, the materialist

is incapable of offering any rational explanation of things,
and must rely on desoription. 30 It is to be noted that after
all is said and done, Santayana returns to his basio supposition, that matter is the source of all things.
29 Muelder-Sears, 190.
30 Essence, 140.
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It may be that the root of this basic

supposition~ies

in

Santayana's observation of the fact that living beings need
matter for their conservation. 31 Could it be that in recognizing this need for matter by living beings in this world, Santayana has concluded that these beings must be constituted of
matter, and only matter, even though his conclusion does not
seem oapable of explaining their life?

Since matter is neces-

sary, why not postulate a material principle?

But, in addition,

why not inolude an immaterial prinoiple which can explain life?
Summarily, this difficulty might be phrased: how can an immaterial issue from a material?

can an effect exceed its cause?

Dr. Rudolf Allers in his critique of Freudianism, The Suocessful Error, manifests a further consequence of any materialistic philosophy: the rejection of all oausality save that of
the efficient oause. 32 Causation, as explained in The Realm of
Truth, oan be reduced to a mere sucoession of one thing from
another. 33 Certainly an effeot does succeed its cause. Since
Santayana's materialism can give him no explanation of oausation from intrinsic principles, he can only desoribe this succession which he observes as causality.- But even Santayana ad31 Matter, 288; Cf. Soepticism, 109.
32 Rudolf Allers, M.D.,ph.D., The Successful Error: A Critioal
Study in Freudian Psyohoanalysis, Shead and Ward, New York,

1940, 94.

33 Truth, 504.

25
mits that in mere succession there is no necessity, not even in
the "so-called laws of nature. n34

•

This generalization, embracing even the laws of nature,
inclines Santayana's reader to suspect that this whole question
of causality could be cleared up if some distinction were made
between absolute necessity or consequence and physical necessity, in which latter, because of the nature of physical laws,
some exception might occur. 55 But Santayana seems to prefer
to center upon the exception and claim absolute spontaneity.
Yet immediately following upon this assertion he retracts to
some degree by stating that this particular event will recur
"spontaneously" if the same external circumstances are given.
Santayana faces a real problem in reconciling his assertion of
spontaneity with his equally emphatiC claim for uniformity in
nature, especially when he realizes himself that life is practically impossible if everything is absolutely spontaneous. 56
Here it might be noted that Santayana ascribes a peculiar
efficacy to external conditions, while he assiduously denies
this same efficacy to a body submitted to these conditions.
For example, the production of a rose from a certain seed is
not, in Santayana's mind, due to the seed, but to the soil and

54 Letter of April 16, 1947: Cf. Matter, 305-4.
55 Matter, 299-500.
56 Ibid., 201-202.
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olimate, which, it he would so speak, "nourish" the seed. 37 He
tavors an absolute potentiality tor every seed, oapable ot
varying its speoifio torm beoause ot the oonditions.

Undoubted-

ly with suoh absolute spontaneity it would not 'be neoessary to
buy pea seeds were one to wish pea vines.

Besides, would it be

possible to have turnips and violets growing next to eaoh
other?

The external conditions would seem to favor one or the

other, but not both.
Consistent with his limitation ot oausality to eftioienoy,
Santayana rejeots teleology or finality.

And yet this state-

ment ought not to be made categorioally.

In The Realm ot

Matter be speaks ot a oertain "mook explanation" in what is
oalled teleology; namely, "When the ground ot things is sought
in their exoellenoe, in their har.mony with their surroundings,
or in the adaptation of organs to their. functions and ot actions
to their intentions."38 Still, he asserts, such correspond~
ences actually exist in the world, and "teleology, it it be
only a name for them, is a patent and prevalent fact in
nature. "39

But how is this taot to be explained?

Onoe again

attention is diverted to external oonditions, which seem to be
invested with an unusual causal potenoy.

37
38
39

Ibid., 289-290.

Ibid., 310.

~.

The explanation ot
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the intrinsic finality of the thing itself which is submitted
to these conditions is evasive.
Instead, we must attribute the pursuit
of this good, and its eventual realization, to her previous blind disposition,
fortified by the fact that circumstfBces
were favorable to that development.
This explanation provokes two questions.

What proof has

santayana for the efficacy of the circumstances?

Is there more

evidence for the action of these external factors than for the
hidden force, the "blind disposition" of the thing? Moreover,
is it philosophical to rest content with this "blind disposition"?

To all appearances Santayanats materialism has left htm
without any ultimate explanations. The opinion stated above 4l
as to the personal and descriptive nature of Santayana's philosophy would seem to be verified here.
fact of

t~leology

He has observed the

in nature and describes it, although he pre-

fers another name for this fact.

But description is not ex-

planation, and one finds a "previous blind disposition" operating under favorable conditions not a whit more elucidating.
Two factors seem accountable for this teleological doctrine, and ultimately both of these factors can be resolved
into one.

The first is

~antayanats

materialism, the inevitable

cause of his failure to offer an adequate explanation.
40
41

Ibid., 323.

~,
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The
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seoond is the understanding, so painful to Santayana, of the
•

oonsequenoes to which a dootrine of final causality inevitably
leads.

Even to the materialistio Santayana the faot of teleOl-

ogy is observable in nature.

But the aotual tendency or "blind

disposition" is something intangible.
this intangible thing with his

Can Santayana explain
It seems that in

materiali~?

this instanoe he would have to relinquish his

materiali~

as

the "pre-supposition of oonventional sanity.n42 The same difficulty is encountered in the theory of cognition.

Santayana rec-

ognizes that only an immaterial faoulty (for him the "spirit,"),
is oapable of the spiritual operation of knowing.

Still, as in

the case of teleology, he does not want to say that this tmmaterial or spiritual operation flows ultimately fram an immaterial prinoiple.

For this reason he enunoiates the prinoiple that

nothing oan be learned of the nature of an agent from its aotion; or, to put it into the words in whioh he expresses it

~n

Soeptioism and Animal Faith: "The only behavior that oan give
proof of thinking is thinking itself."43

Here one enoounters

the two elements of Santayana's philosophy.

The thinking person

is tangible, visible, and, in Santayana's eyes, material.

Since

it is the person who thinks, it is understandable why he says
42 Schilpp, 17.
43 Soepticism, 243.
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that matter is the only power, the only force in the world. 44
But the actual thinking is not material; it is spiritual.

In

his explanation of cognition santayana must fall back on the
person, the material thing, and relegate to the imagination
whatever explanation may be had of the epiphenomenal, immaterial
element.

This lies behind Santayanats distinction between tele-

ology, a faot present in the world, and final causes, which, as
the sources of this intangible tendency, this "blind disposition," he styles "mythical and created by a sort of literary i1lusion."45
The consequenoe of this understanding of finality is that
the "summum bonum" of Plato and the God of the Christian, as
final causes, become figments of the imagination.

This is the

second faotor involved in his doctrine of teleology, to whioh
the first faotor is reducible, beoause it appears that Santayana
rejects finality, not so muoh because of his materialism as for
fear of the consequences of the doctrine.

Santayana himself

bears witness to mankind's long-standing oonviotion that finality is linked with theology.
In either case, after making our bow to
this divine will, out of deference to antiquity and human rhetoric, we should be reduced to studying as far as possible the
crawling prooesses of nature. These will
44 Sohilpp, 509.
45 Matter, 323.
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be the seat of such teleology as surely
exists, and as a critical philosophy may
record withQut falling into rhetorical ambiguities. 46

•

And 1s not materialism a philosophy utterly incompatible with
theology?

Santayana's chosen faith is not religious: "Santa-

yana's faith is, as always, in naturalism, not as a logical
sine gua non, but as the only possible interpretation of experienceo"47
But if materialism rejects all causality save that of the
efficient cause, can not theology still be preserved by efficient causality?

The only reasonable conclusion Santayana's

reader can draw is that "chance, matter, fate---some non-spiritual principle or other,,48 is accountable for the universe.

Ac-

tually, it is difficult to visualize preoisely what Santayana
intends, when passages such as the following occur frequently:
It is sheer ignoranoe to stare at anything as if it were inexplicable and selfcreated, a mere intruder in the world.
The universe itself no doubt
groundless and a perpetual miracle.

!B

His treatment of the order manJest in the universe is simi1ar. 50
First he speaks of a continuous flux, of the "blind course of

46 Ibid., 316-317.
47 Howgate, 110-111.
48 scerticism, 285.
49 Mat er, 224. '
50 Ibid., 306.
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cosmic events,n5l which, however inexplicable, seems to show
some signs of order. 52 In spite of his espousal of chance, of
absolute spontaneity, he finds that "the seasons return, their
fruits varying with the weather; the generations repeat themselves ••• ,,53 Moreover, though he attributes a teleological
function to external conditions to the extent of practically
denying it to the body subjected to these conditions, he discovers a marvelous precision and timeliness in the growth of
an embryo,54 and the bloom of consciousness only in "certain
predetermined classes and intensities of sensation.,,55
Contrary also, to his absolute chance is another fruit of
his materialism, his mechanism, which is not one principle of
explanation among others, but "is explanation itself.,,56

To

divine a mechanism is to observe a recurrence, to fathom a
trope.57 In Santayana's terminology a trope is a name given
to the essence of any event as distinguished fram that event
itself, such as today's sunrise as distinguished from yesterdaY's.58 A trope, then is an expression of that order in the
world which is Santayana's daily experience, although philo-

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
56

Truth, 451.
Matter, 316.
!bld., 228.
!"6'lQ., 353.
346.
Reason in Common Sense, 17.
Edlrian, 283.
Matter, 293, 294.

ma.,
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sophically he espouses absolute chance.

Truly he says .that the

entire universe is a perpetual miracle. 59

From this it is

clear why Santayana's philosophy is not a pure materialism,
since the deterministic nature of materialism is incompatible
with his

indeter.mini~.

Man is of a piece with the rest of creation, and Santayana
claims that he discerns the same mechanism, the same material
forces, even behind man's love and loftiest ambitions. 50 But
is not mechanism oontrary to free will?

Assuredly.

oan Santayana acoount for his own experience?

Then how

Did he not say:

When people feel a power of origination
and decision within them, so that, unless externally hindered, they are free
to do whatever they will, undoubtedly
they are not deceived~5l
Now santayana is faithful to his experience, and must have recourse to his fundamental materialistio supposition to explain
this experienoe.
It is an obsoure, complex, groping movement of the psyohe, or of many psyches
in oontaot: it is a perpetual readjustment of passionate habits of matter. 52
Santayana gives the example of a man with a parohed throat,
who desires water beoause he is thirsty.53

59 Ibid., 224.
50 !aiiiin, 287.
51 Matter, 355.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 313.
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bodily need that craves satisfaction, Santayana concludes that
•

the will is a habit of matter.
will must desire material goods.

As material, it seems that the
But Santayana does not so con-

clude, for he admits that the will can desire immaterial goods:
honor, beauty, love, etc.

Just as in the process of cognition

he denies an immaterial principle for the immaterial "spirit"
which knows, so he consistently denies an immaterial will which
desires immaterial goods.

Could it be that because of his

materialistic supposition, he is unwilling to designate man a
composit.e being, constituted of both material and immaterial
principles?

The need of an immaterial principle is not, as is

commonly supposed among materialists, an a priori religious

be~

lief, but an essential philosophical principle, necessary to
explain the difference between stones, dogs and men.
In conclusion it can be said that Santayana's fundamental
difficulty is to reconcile his poetry and his materialism.

As

a poet he can not renounce the significance of man's spiritual
gifts, and as a materialist, he can not deny the physical origi
of these gifts.

His creed is expressed succinctly:

While the existence of things must be
understood by referring them to their
causes, which are mechanical, their
functions· can only be explained by what
is interesting in their results, in
other words, by their rela~ion to human
nature and to human happiness. 54

64

Interpretation of Poetry and Religion, 91.
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Indeed, it requires a unique theory of causalty to demonstrate
~

the oonsequence of the spiritual oomponent of human nature and
human happiness from a material principle.

A reasonable ex-

planation of mind is impossible for a materialistio philosophy.
The Platonic element in Santayana's philosophy ought to have
provided him with oopious spiritual entities; but it had a
disadvantage which did not acorue to materialism, that of leading to the Platonic "summum

b~num".

The connotations of that

Idea were too much for Santayana, and aocordingly he renounoed
Catho1icism in favor .ot naturallsm. 65

65 Howgate, 46.

CHAPTER III
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF TRANSCENDENTAL MAT'ERIALISM
The critical problem lies at the root of Santayana's transcendental materialism.

His materialistic pre-supposition ren-

ders difficult a rational explanation of an immaterial mind.
Hence, an even greater insight into Santayana's pOSition can be
gained by examining his idea of the nature of man, the knowing
being, and illustrate his concept of the manner in which man
knows.
Fundamental to Santayana's psychology is a material
"psyche," the "self-maintaining and reproducing pattern or
structure of an organism, conceived as a power."l The actual
form of an organism, such as a plant, hides a power capable of
maintaining or restoring that form.

This potentiality, Which

is often concentrated in a seed, dwells in the matter of the
organism, but in a manner cloaked in mystery, "so that for observation the form itself seems to be a power (when locked in
that sort of substance or seed) and to work towards its own
manifestation."2

This psyche, in its moral unity, "is a poetic

or mythological notion, but is needed to mark the hereditary
vehement movement in organisms towards specific forms and

1

2

,irit, 15.

lid.
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functions. n3

•

This last description of the psyche by Santayana can not
be read without evoking a question mark.

How can this "hered-

itary movement" towards specific forms be reconciled with the
absolute potentiality Santayana attributes to every seed, Which
is capable of varying its specific form according to the conditions which foster it?4

The very teleology Which, in the pre-

vious chapter, Santayana styled a "mock explanation" is no
longer ludicrous.

The "blind disposition" there depicted now
enters in in the guise of the psyche. 5
Another point to be noted in connection with Santayana's
description of the psyche quoted above is its "moral unity".
Why does Santayana call this moral unity a "poetiC notion?"

Is

there anything in Santayana's own experience to deny the reality of this moral unity, this acting as a unit?

There seems

to be only one satisfactory answer to this query: that Santayana realized the insufficiency of his materialism to explain

3 Ibid., 15.
4 Ditter, 289-290.
5 Supra, 26-27. The task of interpreting Santayana is no easy
one. In The Rea1m of Spirit he speaks Of this power as
"often concentrated in a seed." (Slirit, 15.) In The Rea1m
of Matter he flatly contradicts th s assertion.
The mysterious potentiality packed in
the seed would, then, not be internal
to it, or due to a speCially wonderful
essence therein embodied.
-- The Rea1m of Matter, 289-290.

~-.--------~-------"~
37

the unity of action in human beings.
act as a unit.

Of itself matter Foes not

To state that this matter has an innate disposi-

tion for adhesion not only begs the question, but also indicates that something besides matter is required.

In his treat-

ment of the spirit, Santayana furnishes abundant evidence for
the discrete nature of matter.

Happiness is found when the

spirit attains its transcendental throne, and establishes itself in equilibrium amidst diverse material demands. 6 Moreover, what would Santayana say of experience, which, in its own
admirable fashion, teaches every man that the material organs
of his own body are in constant antagonism unless something is
present to harmonize them?

Did a man's stomach ever cease from

craving for food because it realized that it was making the man
sick?
Santayana is

logica~

then, in attributing only moral unity

to the material psyche, and denying to it any real or metaphysical unity.
In saying this I am far from wishing to
attribute a metaphysical fixity or unity
to the psyche, or to claim for my own
person an absolute Singleness and consistency. Some passive drifting and
some fundamental vagueness there must
be in every animal mind; and the bestknit psyche still participates in the
indefinite flux of matter, is self-forgetful in part, and is mortal.?

6 Cf. Spirit, 262.
? Schilpp, 25.
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santayana explains the psyche as the source of the spirit, and,
•

therefore, the source of all spiritual functions, such as consciousness.

This psyche "participates in the indefinite flux

of matter," and probably does so in the same way as our material
bodies participate, by undergoing, as the biologists say, a
change every seven years.

Now if this psyche is changing, cer-

tainly its spiritttal function must also change.

The problem of

memory, then, as well as each man's consciousness that he is
the same person wbo lived seven, ten, or twenty years ago, becomes insoluble.

Hence it is understandable why Santayana de-

nies to his person "an absolute singleness and consistency."
But is he not also denying the cammon conviction of all mankind,
that a man remains the same even though his material body is
undergoing constant change, a conviction, indeed, which forms
the basis for the sanctions of law?

Once again it seems that

Santayana must forfeit his materialism for the sake of sanity,
rather than posit materialism for sanity's sake.
santayana acknowled@es that he borrowed the ter.m "psyche"
from Aristotle; but his "psyche" is nota "form" in the Aristotelian sense.

Aristotle's "psyche" is the form of the body,

the intelligible element of a composite being.

Santayana's

"psyche," on the contrary, is "this self of mine," the "active
and passionate" man Which each one of us perceives himself to
be.

It

~s

the self which is "a principle of steady life"; the

self' which "slumbers and breathes below, a mysterious natural

"....-
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organism, full of dark yet definite potentialities. n8 There is

..

a world of difference between the two, sinoe the Aristotelian
form is the intelligible element of a oomposite, while very
little is known about Santayana's psyche.

Apparently all that

santayana oan say about the inner oonstitution of this psyohe
is that it is material; yet not a substance or an atom, but a
mode of substanoe, or, in other terms, a definite organization
of matter. 9 This materialistio explanation of man's psyohe
seems to result fram Santayana's conclusion that since composite beings depend upon matter, a material principle must be
their only principle. lO
Why

is it that Santayana knows so little about the psyche?

He answers in Soeptioism and Animal Faith:
I must discard at onoe, as inoompatible
with the least oritioism, the notion
that nature or oertain parts of nature
are known to be animatel~eoause they
behave in oertain ways.
In other words Santayana would say that the observation of any
operation informs the speotator that such an action is capable
of being performed by the operator, and tells the spectator
nothing about the nature of the operator.

For eXRmple, the ex-

ponent of this position would logioally be forced to say:

8

9

soeEticism, 148-149.

Mat er, 332.

10 Supra, 23.
11 Sceptioism, 243.
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"If the dog runs, he runs;tt and not, "If the dog runs, he is a
•
tt
living being.
But does not santayana himself say that consciousness and cognition are functions of the spirit, and therefore immaterial?

To be consistent with himself, then, he must

not call the psyche material when he observes only spiritual
operations.

Rather than have recourse to his basic pre-supposi-

tion, materialism, he should at most profess the agnosticism he
admits elsewhere.
I cannot hope to discover, therefore,
what precisely this psyche is, this
self of mine, the existence of which
is so indubitable
my active and
passionate nature.

i%

If operations tell him nothing of the nature of the operator, then Santayana's psychology must be behavioristic.

Ac-

tually he does consider behavioristic, or, as he sometimes says,
biological psyChology,13 as the only scientific pSYChology;14
for the scientific psychologist is bound to the observation of
physical facts, of material events. 15 If the object of this
scientific knowledge is only the operations of the psyche,
Santayana rightfully concludes that he does not know "this self
of mine," because he knows only his activities.

To this can be

traced the reason for one of his fundamental dogmas, his own ex-

12 Ibid., 148-149.
13 tetter of June 15, 194?
14 Scepticism, 251; Spirit, 282.
15 Scepticism, 257.
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istence,16 "which is so indubitable to my active and ~ssionate
nature," and yet undemonstrable by his materialistic psychology.l?
Since the scientific psychologist examines physical facts
or material events, how does Santayana classify the other manifestations of his "active and passionate nature?"

To literary

psychology, the art of imagining how animals feel and think,lS
belong "sensuous images, memories, lyric effusions, and dramatic
myths. ,,19

Santayana remarks that even the simplest perception

of scientific psychology has present in it an element which
only poetry can desoribe or sympathy conceive.

In scientific
psychology are involved words, actions and attitudes. 20 But

these words, actions and attitudes are not the understanding of
the words, nor the sense of the attitudes and actions.

Clearly,

Santayana conceives the necessity of a mind to interpret these
data of scientific psychology.

But since he has declared that

actions are not indicative of the nature of the thing acting,
he must rely on the fallible imagination to conjure up an inter

16
I?

Ibid., 243.

~reasonably

questions this use of the term. "psychology".
Santayana borrowed the Greek tem "psyche"; but of what
profit is it to speak of ttscientific psychology" when this
science can produce no information about the ttpsyche," but
only catalogue its activities, which are powerless to
reveal its nature?
IS scetticism, 252.
19 Mat er, 315.
20 Scepticism, 252.
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pretation.

An example might olarify this point.

Were

~anta

yana to see a man with flushed oountenanoe vio1ently waving his
arms, and addressing his ferooity to another man, Santayana
could only olassify the activities as given in the desoription.
He could not say that the symptoms indicated anger, or that the
language betrayed the human nature of the agent.
agine that this is the oase.

He might im-

But surely if the angry man were

to address himself to Mr. Santayana, Santayana would forget his
materialistio "pre-supposition of oonventional sanity," and aoknowledge that it is not a case of imagination, but an incontrovertible, reasonable fact.
It seems olear that Santayana's materialism is a factor in
his preferenoe for the imagination.

It is the materialist voic-

ing the opinion that "there is no suoh thing as mental substanoe, mental foroe, mental maohinery, or mental oausation."2l
By this Santayana does not intend to deny the immateriality of
mental faots, but only a spiritual souroe for mental reality.
Substanoe, in diversifying the field of
nature, sometimes takes the form of animals in whom there are feelings, images,
and thoughts~ These mental faots are
immaterial.2~

Could this be an instanoe of Santayana's oentering his whole attention upon the material oonoomitant, and thus upon only half
of the faots?

21
22

Matter, 380.

Ibid.,

233.
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The important point to grasp is that this assertioJl of mental or spiritual reality without a source of the same nature is
the basis for Santayana's dichotomY between transcendentalism
and his materialism.

Santayana himself equivalently admits

this fact:
He (man) constantly exerts power, sometimes visibly by bodily acts; but often
the physical souroes of his power are
hidden from his mind, or not attended
to, and he attributes his action to his
ideas. But his ideas have no place in
the traoeable sequence of material events;
they brood over that flux like the ~R
visible gods or the laws of nature.
Since "ideas have no place in the traceable sequence of material events," they have no place in Santayana's scientific psychology.

For this reason Santayana must have recourse to the

imagination for a psychology of ideas.

~d

sinoe ideas merely

"brood over that flux," they exert no influence on material
events.

Thus Santayana denies all final causality to ideas,

and places an insurmountable barrier between mind and matter,
between his transcendentalism and materialism.
Santayana's effort to surmount this barrier involves him
in an unusual problem of causality.

How does the material psy-

che generate the knowing, immaterial spirit?

In Aristotelian

terminology, says Santayana,24 the psyohe is a physical potency,

23 Spirit, 280-281.
24 Letter of April 16, 1947.
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a material entity existing in potency.

Spirit is the

this potency: it is the "existens in actu".

a~t

of

In an effort to

clarify this generation of the spirit, Santayana was asked if it
were not true that Aristotle himself would demand a proportion
between a potency and its act, since a "potency" signifies
"capability for an act", and a definite potency is specified by
its act. 25 $antayana replied:
Your difficulties in understanding my
philosophy do not surprise me, and I
think they are insurmountable as long
as you reason on Scholastic axiom~6
such as nihil dat quod non habet.
In concrete ter.minology Santayana's reply would mean that it is
possible to obtain a cow fram an acorn.

Santayana continued:

Since the 'quod' or 'quid' is defined
as an essence---nothing existent is definable---the system of the world be
comes entirely a system of essences. 27
Yet if nothing existent is definable, but only essences, which
are logical or ideal terms, then Santayana's philosophy is entirely in the ideal order.
But he realizes that a purely ideal philosophy, a pure
transoendentalism, ·is utterly divorced from external reality.
In order to remain faithful to his experience of an existing reality external to himself, Santayana posits his materialism to

25 A letter to Santayana by the author.
26 Letter of June 15, 1947.
27 ill!.
.
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explain this external reality.

But since "nothing exi§tent is

definable," this materialism is actually incapable of affording any real explanation.

Thus his materialism remains a "pre-

supposition of conventional sanity," and the "facts" that it is
designed to explain are "brute facts" Which any man loyal to
his experience can not deny.

For example, Santayana is con-

strained "merely to register as a brute fact the emergence of
consciousness in animal bodies."28
explanation of this brute fact?

Does Santayana offer any

In The

Rea~

of Truth he

states that consciousness is due to certain tropes or cycles
fixed in matter, or in other words, to material organization. 29
Undoubtedly it is true that living beings are highly organized,
but can mere material organization explain their life?

Most

probably Santayana would consider this to be a biological, not
a philosophical problem.

But it does not seem fair to accept

as a philosophical fact a highly-disputed biological opinion,
however well it may accord with a materialistio philosophy.
Amterialism or material organization might, with an equal degree of intellectual honesty, be rejected as an explanation of
life on the scientific data of such renouned biologists as
Driesch, McDougall, Carrel, and other Vitalists.

Moreover, a

philosopher ought not to rest content with "material organization" as an explanation, because certainly he will be asked

28
29

Schilpp, 17-18.
Truth, 516-517.
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whence comes this organization.

Not only, then, does Santa•
,ana's transcendentalism, in which only essences are definable,
prevent him fram explaining anything existent; but also the very
materialism which he has invoked to explain reality utterly
fails to supply a convinoing, ultimate explanation.

This fail-

ure to explain adequately has led us to characterize Santayana's philosophy as description,30 since both elements of man,
the material and the tmmaterial are represented, though without
sufficient justifioation, in transoendental materialism.
The irreconcilable dichotomy between transcendentalism and
materialism is echoed in the cleavage between Santayana's literary and scientifio psychology.

Subjective data, Santayana ad-

mits, may be signs of powers at work, but they are "the insubstantial fabrio of a vision."3l

Any attempt to investigate the

nature of these signs, or a fortiori, these powers, belongs to
literary psyohology, to the imaginative faoulty, and oonsequently are mental constructions.

Although his scientifio or

behavioristic psychology, the fruit of his materialism, is limited to the olassification 'of material events, it is incapable
of rendering an explanation of the psyche, sinoe an operation is
not indicative of the nature of its principle.

Ib~eover,

Santayana refuses to examine the psyche because the analysis of
substanoe, whioh he holds to be material, belongs to the physi-

30 Supra, 23.
31 Letter of April 16, 1947.
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cist, not to the metaphysician. 32 As a result of this.dichotomy Santayana speaks of reason as "matter organized, and assuming a form at once distinctive, plastic, and opportune;"33
while the life of reason, as he conceives it,
is a mere romance, and the life of nature
a mere fable; such pictures have no metaphysical value, even if as sympathetic
fictione they had some psychological
truth. 34
From Santayana's theory of knowledge flows his transcendental materialism.

As a Critical Realist, santayana postu-

lates the necessity of something or other to bridge the gap between the external world and the knowing subject's mind.

Some

philosophers style this medium a concept, a representation of
the existing object.

Santayana prefers the ter.m "datum," which

he defines as "a theme of attention, a term in passing thought,
a visioned universal."35
name of "essence".

To t~ datum Santayana attaches the

He himself describes this as a universal

••• which may be given immediately, whether
to sense or to thought. Only universals
have logical or aesthetic individuali~y,
or can be given directly, clearly, and
all at once. When Aristotle said that the
senses gave the particular, he doubtless
meant by the senses the complete fighting
sensibility of animals, with the reactive
instinct and sagacity which posits a ma-

32 Letter of June 15, 1947.
33 Schilpp, 24.
34 sceaticiam, 101.
35 Ibl., 54-55.
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terial object and places it in its exter•
nal relations, here, now, and in such a
quarter. But the senses as understood by
modern idealism suggest rather a passive
consciousness of some aesthetic datum,
and this (which I call intuition) can
never find anything but an ideal individual, which being individuated only by its
intrinSiC quality, not by any external or
dynamic relations (since none are given,
i.e., existence, origin, date, place,
substance, function and duration) is also
a universal. This object of pure sense
or pure thought, with no belief superadded,
an objeot inwardly complete and individual,
but without ext~rnal relations or B~ysical
status, is what I call an essence.
The role an essenoe plays in Santayana's theory of cognition is
that of a stepping-stone between two leaps.

The ttleap of intui-

tion, from the state of the living organism to the consciousness of some essence,"37 is followed by the "leap of faith and
aotion, from the symbol actually given in sense or in thought
to some ulterior existing object. tt38
We have seen that according to Santayana the material psyche in its act of transcendence generates spirit.

The essence

which is the object of the spirit's intuition is a symbol, an
ideal, non-existent term, a mere possibility which exists in th
mind. 39

36

How does this essence become the object of the spirit's

George Santayana, "Three Proofs of Realism," in Essays in
Critical Realism: A Co-operative Stud, of the Problem of
KnOWled~e, 163-184, Peter smith, New ork, 1941, 168.

37 Ibid. ,83.
38 IDid'.
39 ~er of April 16, 1947.
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eye?

To this question Santayana would answer that it was

aroused by an external stimulus.

He illustrates with a butter-

cup.40 A buttercup present to the eye calls up the essence or
the name of "yellow."

This essence is not a particular, but a

universal term of perception, which is given only when attention is stretched to the thing, that is, when the buttercup
evokes the term.

Santayana emphatically states that this es-

sence is not abstracted fram the buttercup; and that in this
intuition the mind foouses the essence "yellow," and not the
buttercup.4l This latter point sharply differentiates Santayana t S "reaJmof essence" from Aristotle t s "realm of concepts,"
although Santayana says that the two have this in common: that
both are realms

o~

ble of existence. 42

possible beings, not yet existing, but capaThe intrinsically and inalienably e~ernal

and universal nature of Santayana's essence is patently suggestive of the Platonic Idea. 43 But Santayana believes Platonic
Ideas to be prototypes only of things existing in our present
cosmos.

The realm of essence is, however, absolute, taking in

all possible worlds; and as for Leibniz, so for Santayana, God
must have chosen this particular world because it was the

40 sce~ticism, 94.
41 Tm h. 438.
42 Terence O'Connor, O.S.M., An account of interviews with
Santayana, sent to the author in a letter of Apr. 16, 1947.
43 Essence, 120.
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best. 44
Since an essence is, then, but a name, a logical ter.m
called forth by a stimulus---a doctrine which suggests Santayana's indebtedness to Locke and Berkeley---intuition must be of
names, not of things. 45 But if a definite essence is evoked by
a definite stimulus, there must be some connection between this
essence and this stimulus; otherwise, how would this particular
essence become the object of intuition?

The stimulus, there-

fore, must be examined to account for the occurrence in the mind
of this particular essence.
This introduces the second leap involved in cognition, the
leap of faith and action.

This is the act of transcendenoe

which has previously been described: in which the material psyche, in searching for the source of the stimulus, must transcend itself, thereby acquiring "a subjeotive spiritual acoompaniment,"46

so that the being perceives.

The act of inoip-

ient transcendence, or the searching out for the stimulus in
its source, involves expectation or anticipation of something
out there.
faith. ft

This anticipation or watchfulness is called "animal

Knowledge, says Santayana, consists in sensation,

44 Letter of April 16, 1947. Infra., 67 et sq. for Santayana's idea of God. Apparently Santayana has forgotten
that "chance, matter, fate--- some non-spiritual principle
or otherft is aocountable for the universe. Supra, 36.
45 Essence, 35; scetticism, 188.
46 Letter of Apr!l 6, 1947.
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animal faith, and the act of transcendence, or rather, 7hat aspires to be knowledge.

If the source of the sttmulus is found,

actual knowledge is had.
Knowledge thus understood involves a

cla~

or belief,

since "the given essence will be the essence of the object
meant," or, I "instinctively affirm it to be the essence of an
existence confronting me. ,,47
firmation made?

But on what grounds is this af-

In the example of the buttercup, Santayana

said that the essence of yellow was perceived.

But if this es-

sence is only a name, what reason is there for attributing it
to the buttercup, since yellow says yellow, and not buttercup?
Is there another essence called buttercup?
'might clarify the problem.

Another example

The object of an intuition is the

essence "rose", a universal term which might apply to any rose,
red or white.

Supposing this to be the case, the essence "rose

which is the object of the intuition would not give any

par-

ticular knowledge of the red rose which is actually before the
knower.

If the essence "red" should appear, then it would seem

that there is something peculiar to the actual rose which would
make "red" appear and not "white".

The problem becomes further

complicated when several objects are encountered in experience,
as when a person takes a comprehensive view of the whole garden, with a host of variegated flowers and other objects.

47

Scepticism, 107.
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Clearly, a multitude of essences would stream into conscious..
ness.

Vfuat reason exists for assigning the "red" to a rose,

"green" to leaves, etc:?

If essences are merely ideal or es-

thetic terms, there is no reason why one person's identification of certain terms with certain objects of experience should
agree with another's.

This is certainly true in the case of the

provincial name "prairie dog" for "coyote".

If essences are

names, then there should be two objects of knowledge, but in reality there is only one.

And if essences are the objects of

knowledge, then how would two men intuiting these different essences know that they actually do see the same object? Even
Santayana seems at ttmes to realize this, for he says elsewhere:
"But it is events, in natural knowledge, that are the true objects; and the given essences are only the terms in which those
events are described."48

The same idea is conveyed in somewhat

different terms in SceptiCism and Animal Faith.
Thus scientifio psychology confirms
the criticism of knowledge and the experience of life which proclaim that
the immediate objects of intuition are
mere appearances,. and that nothing
given exists as lt is given. 49
But so long as essences, mere names or descriptive terms of
events or appearances, remain the data of intuition, Santayana
oan not logically assert that he knows an event or an appear-

48 Essence, 166.
49 SceptiCism, 66.
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ance.

•
Santayana's last phrase, "that nothing given exists as it

is given," reminds us of the Lockian idea that secondary qualities do not exist in the object, but are the subject's reaction
to that object.

Santayana's statement is, however, not re-

stricted to secondary qualities; it includes primary qualities
such as extension and resistance as well.

But if e:;tension and

other primary qualities do not exist in the object, one stands
on the verge of absolute scepticism.
In The Realm of Matter Santayana speaks of ideas as "the
forms which things wear in human experience,n50 indicating that
he intends "essence" to Signify the actual appearanoe of an object, and not just a name for that appearanoe.

These different

appearances will lead, he says, to an underlying substance
whioh can be the butt for action. 51 But since operations are
wholly unindioative of the nature of the operator, Santayana's
appearances can tell him nothing of the nature of this substance.

Consequently, here again he relies on his fundamental

"pre-supposition" for an explanation of that substanoe, namely
matter.
It seems that many of the difficulties whioh beset Santayana's doctrine of essence would be resolved if he were to
50
51
L

Matter, 223.
Ibid.,

-
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center knowledge in an external objeot, and not in an essenoe.
4
ThUS he oould more resolutely state: "There is really a world,

and there are real objeots in eaoh oase to be desoribed;n52 and
would not have to terminate in the idealism expressed in a
passage like this:
Our ideas are acoordingly only subjeotive signs, while we think them objeotive qualities; and the whole warp
and woof of our knowledge is rhetorioal while we think it physioally exi~
tent and oonstitutive of the world. 5
But in spite of Santayana's profession of a pure idealism, the
majority of men have the oonviotion that they know things,
things outside of themselves.

True, they would admit with

Santayana the subjeotive power of attention, and, by dint of ingrained habit, subjeotive interpretation of external data. 54
But to all appearanoes, unless the essenoesor data of intuition
somehow belong to external objeots, man is eternally divoroed
from any true knowledge of the external world.

Even Santayana

himself oomes to this conclusion:
In regard to the original articles of
the animal creed---that there is a
world, that there isa future, that
things sought oan be found, and things
seen oan be eaten---no guarantee can
possibly be offered. I am sure these
dogmas are often false ••• 55
From this can be understood Santayana's purpose in entitling
52 Truth, 458.
53 Ibid.
54 ~er, 351.
55 Sceptioism, 180.
l

rr

,

\

55

the introductory volume to his

mat~rer

philosophical wqrks

and Animal Faith. Without doubt his scepticism has
-Scepticism
brought him to the point he thought:
Let me then push scepticism as rar as I
logically can, and endeavor to clear my
mind or illusion, eveB6at the price or
intellectual suicide.
Despite intellectual hari-kari, Santayana's common sense
argues ror the existence or material things 57 and his own existence. 58 However, ror Santayana, this existence is the rruit
or animal faith, a conviction literally shocked into him.
its very nature existence is mad.

Of

It is a blind flux, thought-

lessly running on, which "neither knows nor cares that it is
making.,,59
What is the origin or this concept?

It has already been

seen that the realm of essence is absolute, that essences are
non-existent, and that God selected this particular world because it was the best. 60 Since everything could have been
other than it actually is, or, in Santayana's terminology,
since an essence is only accidentally the essence of an existing thing, Santayana calls the world "contingent".6l For him
"contingent" means "accidental" or "by chance," so that he

56 Ibid., 10.
57 I'6'I(I ~, 145.
58 I'6IQ., 141.
59 Matter, 347-348; Scepticism, 16l-l62.
60 Supra, 48.
(
61 Letter of April 16, 1947.
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seems to be forgetful of his statement that God
world.

If the world

selecte~

the

then Santayana is perfectlY logical in concluding that existence is irrational. 52 This
is~ntingent,n

1s a necessary consequence of his reduction of causation to a
mere succession of one thing after another, because in mere succession there is no necessity.53

Existence is also irrational

for Santayana in the sense that "nothing existent is de finable,n64 so that the only explanation Santayana has for existence is his "pre-supposition," materialism.

It still remains

for Santayana to reconcile the irrational flux of existence, an
expreSSion of his "absolute spontaneity" or indeterminism, with
his mechanism.

But Santayana will never answer any questions

relative to existence: first, because it is irrational and due
to chance; and secondly, because he never distinguishes existence from existents, and these belong to the phYSicist's investigation, not the metaphysician t s. 65
It is Santayana's theory of knowledge Which best elucidates the dichotomy of his philosophy.

Essences, as names, are

mere words Which are the data known by the mind.

If this is

true, then Santayana can never arrive at that understanding of
the words, which, he says, is totally different from the words

52 Of.Scepticism, 208,284; Matter, 295-296, 305, 347-348.
53 Supra, 24.
54 Butra, 43.
55 Le ter of April 16, 1947.
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themselves. 66

To interpret these ideal data, he must indulge
•
in literary psychology, in imaginative fancy. Since these
eSsences are not, and never will be, "the essences of
things,,,67 Santayana never can know existing things.

.

But

common sense postulates something as the butt for action, so
that Santayana falls back for an explanation of this utterly
unknowable thing on a "pre-supposition of conventional sanity,"
materialism.

66 Scepticism, 252.
67 Essence, 135-136.
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CHAPTER IV

THE ETHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIALISM
T.he study of the dichotomy in Santayana's ethics and theology will be of a different nature from that made of his psychology and epistemology in the last chapter.

"Psyche" and "ex-

istence" were found to be philosophical expressions of his
materialism.

"Essence," as an ideal or logical object of knowl-

edge, was discovered to be the fruit of a pure transcendentalism.

"Spirit," however, straddles the fence.

It is a term of

Santayana's philosophical materialism as the fruition of a material psyche; while at the same time it is ideal, in that it is
the immaterial power of perception.

Its ideal character is

further emphasized by the fact that its investigation belongs to
literary psychology, to the fancies of the imagination.

Thus i

the previous chapter Santayana's dichotomy was actually found in
the philosophical terms of his own choosing, and in his development of a dualism in a philosophy, as it were, of these very
terms.

In his ethics and theology, on the other hand, Santa-

yana's philosophical expression is materialistic.
root of morality and theology.

Matter is the

A transcendental or idealistic

element is to be found not in the terms, but in the goal of
morality and theology, in the very ideal life of living in the
mind. l
1 Muelder-Sears, 190.
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..

Santayana considers himself a moral philosopher, who bears
the message that "morality and religion are expressions of hurna
nature.,,2

This "human nature," however, is simply matter.

At

the root of morality lies the material psyohe as the ultimate
power and souroe of life. 3 This psyohe, aooording to Santayana,
is so oonstituted that it aspires after good, and thereby "introduoes the element of preferenoe, the distinotion between
good and evil, suooess and failure,"4

Yet Santayana is oareful

to point out in The Realm of Matter that the movement of nature
can not be attributed to the anteoedent influenoe of the future
good whioh she might realize.

There is no real teleology based

on a realization of ends.
Instead, we must attribute the pursuit
of this good, and its eventual realization, to her previous blirid disposition,
fortified by the faot that oiroumstgnoes
were favorable to that development.
Thus Santayana makes it quite olear that "the root of morality
is animal bias,,;6 and that when he speaks of "good", he intends
psyohologioal good, since he admits of no objective or ontological good. 7 As a result Santayana's morality is strictly relative; good and evil are relative to the nature of animals, and

2 Sohilpp, 23 •
. 3 Spirit, 16; Persons and Plaoes, 244.
4 Spirit, 242.
5 Matter, 323.
6 Truth, 483.
7 Aooount of interviews in letter of April 16, 1947.
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irreversible in that relation. 8 For this doctrine Santayana

..

says he is indebted to Spinoza, and he clafms that this is the
cause of his enthusiasm for the Jewish philosopher. 9
The logioal outoome of this theory of morality oan be seen
in Santayana's ooncept of "value".

For him "value" is a rela-

tive, and, therefore, a subjeotive thing: "a dignity which anything may aoquire in view of the benefit or satisfaotion whioh
it brings to some living being."lO Mr. Howgate believes that
for Santayana satisfaotion is the very touoh-stone of value.
We are now in a position to inquire what
is the ultimate desideratum of the good
life? Santayana's answer is brief---happiness. 'Happiness is the only sanotion of
life; where happiness fails, existenoe remains a mad and lamentable experiment. ,11
There is nothing shameful to him in aoknowledging pleasure as a oriterion of
moral worth. Santayana's philosophy is
a frank hedonism. 'The more pleasure a
universe oan yield, other things being
equal, the more benefioient and generous
is its general nature; the more pains its
oonstitution involves, the darker and more
malign is its total temper ••• To deny that
pleasure is a good and pain an evil is a
grotesque affeotation.,12 It will be .
notioed, however, that the pursuit of
pleasure is not to be a mere selfish ,enterprise. The ideal is lost sight of

8 Sohilpp, 10.
9 Persons and Plaoes, 244.
10 George Santayana, Platonism and The Spiritual Life,
Chas. Soribner's Sons, New York, 1927, 3.
11 Reason in Common Sense, 238.
12 ibid., 54-55.
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'when a man cultivates his gardenplot of private pleasures, leaving it
to chance and barbarian fury to govern
the state and quicken the world's
passions.,~3 The happiness of the
greatest number must be striven for ••• 14
A contradiction inherent in Santayana's philosophy becomes
evident as one peruses this passage.

Loyal to experience,

santayana admits the altruistic tendenoy in mants nature.
can this altruism be accounted for by a material psyche?

Yet,
The

commonly experienced injunction of animal bias is to flee from
the revolting sight and odor of leprosy.

If animal bias is the

criterion of value, why would a doctor and nurse consider their
actions good and remain heroically at their postS?
A material psyche as the root of morality raises another
difficulty.

It would seem from the very nature of a material

potency, that if this physical potency is the ultimate criterion of right and wrong, of good and evil, then physical, material objects must be the ultimate right and wrong, good and
evil.

It remains, therefore, to be explained how men can de-

sire immaterial goods, such as honor and fame, and this frequently in opposition to their desires for material goods, such
as money or health.

13

George Santayana, Reason in SCience, Chas. Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1906, 270.
14 Howgate, 116-117.
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Santayana has strenuously rejected objective standardS of
right and wrong. 15 The individual's psyche, in its animal bias,
furnishes these standards.

The psyche, then, determines what

actions are right and wrong.

If a man's psyche determines that

it is good to kill the man's enemy, then the killing is a good
act.

But is this in harmony with the general opinion of men?

Men juqge that the sanctions of law are just, and are to be applied whether the criminal believes he did well or not.

For

santayana, the same psyche which is the prinoiple of morality is
the principle of reason.

Consequently, in this oase of killing,

the psyche as the principle of reason would contradict the psyche as the principle of morality.

Should Santayana argue that

punishment for murder has for its purpose the redress of a wrong
perpetrated on society, then men must revise their ideas on the
just punishment of malefactors.

Subjectively, or according to

Santayana's norms, no real crime has been committed, so that society can not justly demand retribution.

In addition, can a

subjective criterion of right and wrong afford a reasonable explanation of the sense of guilt and shame that the majority of
men experience when they, in the usual sense of the term, "do
wrong"?

Sinoe Santayana agrees with man's common experience of .

oriminal actions, he must find another explanation for the criminal nature of these actions.

He states: "The phYSical terror

of murder has made murder criminal ••• ,,16

15 ~irit, 234.
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But does reason oon-
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firm this explanation?

Is the hardened, sadistio murderer free

•
from the guilt
of his crime because his crime does not fill him
with physioal terror, but gives him, rather, a thrilling sensation of pleasure?

Is he innocent of any transgression of law?

If so, penitentiaries and electric chairs are unjust.
Santayana would probably objeot to this reduction of his
individualized ethics to moral license and anarohy.

Lest suoh

chaos should result fram his theory, Santayana has imposed certain ohecks and balances. 17

First, he recognizes in human

nature a permanent core which tends to maintain uniformity in
moral values.

Secondly, the "blind

dispositio~"

of the psyohe

must be direoted towards some end, sinoe Santayana says that a
person's entire life must be oonsidered, the sum-total of his
wants and aspirations, in the oonstruotion of an ideal.

In ad-

dition, "a harmony and oo-operation of impulses should be oonoeived, leading to the maximum satisfaction possible in the
whole oommunity of spirits affeoted by our action.,,18

In Ego-

tism and German Philosophy is expressed that harmony whioh is
the aim of Santayana's philosophy of a good life.
There is a steady human nature within
us, whioh our moods and passions may
wrong but oannot annul ••• There is no
oategorioal imperative but only the
operation of instinots and interests
more or less subjeot to disoipline and
17
18

Cf. Howgate, 115.
Reason in Common Sense, 256.
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mutual adjustment. Our whole life is
a compromise, an incipient loose harmony between the passions of the soul
and the forces of nature, forces which
likewise generate and protect the
souls of other creatures, endowing them
with powers of expression and selfassertion comparable with our own, and
with aims no le!s sweet and worthy in
,their own eyes.
Although this is an admirable expression of Greek moral
ideals, Santayana accomplishes this harmony at the cost of a
compromise of his own philosophical principles.

He speaks of

the "permanent core of human nature" and "a steady human nature
within us."

In his system, where "chance" has superseded cau-

sality, is there room for a steady human nature, especially
since the material psyche "still participates in the indefinite
flux of matter?"20

He states that this "steady human nature"

may be wronged by our moods and passions.

certainly our moods

and passions are spiritual products, and as such in Santayana's
philosophy, stem from the material psyche.

But if the psyohe

or the self furnishes the norms for morality, it seems impossible to speak of a mood or a passion wronging our steady human
nature.

Besides, the operations of instinots and interests, as

experience bears witness, does not always result in a mutual ad
justment and harmony.

The lioness' instinot of self-preserva-

tion is sacrifioed to her maternal instinct when she must defeId

19
20

George Santayana, Egotism in German PhilOSO!h~,
Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1915, 167- ~.
Schllpp, 26.
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her oubs.

This saorifioe results in the very opposite ..of har-

mony, her own destruotion.

Another one of the oheoks whioh

Santayana has elaborated to prevent his individualized ethios
from running headlong into moral ohaos is the "ideal" towards
whioh the "blind disposition" of the psyohe tends, the epitome
of a person's wants and aspirations.

Inriew of Santayana's re-

jeotion of finality, is it possible for this "ideal" to have
any influenoe on the psyohe, for the movement of nature oan not
be attributed "to the anteoedent influenoe of the future good
whioh she might realize?"2l
Moral truth, as Santayana oonoeives it, is also relative.
It signifies, he asserts, "only oomplete, enlightened, ultimate
sinoerity.,,22

Having abolished an objeotive standard of moral-

ity, Santayana is oonsistent when he rejeots an objeotive oriterion for the truth of morality.

"But there. would seem to be

no oonoeivable objeot or reality in referenoe to whioh any type
of morality oould be oalled true. n23
A materialistio ethio like

Santayana'~with

satisfaotion

as the touoh-stone of value, oaters to the sensitive, the mater
ial part of man's nature.

However, Santayana ·himself realizes

that man's oonsoienoe has invariably rebelled against the gro
ing sensitive satisfaotion of materialism, and reverted in some
21 Matter, 323.
22 Truth, 484.
23 Ibid., 4?4.
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form or other to a cultus of the unseen.

What

kinship~has

the

soul with the eternal and the ideal, whereby it is saddened by
the thought of death, and clings to the hope of some power that
may make it permanent amid the surrounding flux?

Santayana

bluntly affirms: "I believe there is nothing immortal."24
once again Santayana is found faithful to experience.

Yet

Poet

that he is, he continually senses the immortal stirrings of his
own spirit.

To meet this need of the soul, he supplies the no-

tion of ideal immortality.

In it he reaches the very pinnacle

of his idealism, a point far removed from his earth-bound materialism.
Since the ideal has this perpetual pertinence to moral struggles, he who lives
in the ideal and leaves it expressed in
society or in art enjoys a double immortality. The eternal has absorbed him
while he lived, and when he is dead his
influence brings others to the same absorption, making them, through that ideal
identity with the best in him, reincarnations and perennial seats of all in him
which he could rationally hope to rescue
rram destruction ••• By becoming the spectator and confessor of his own death and
of universal mutation, he will have identified himself with what is spiritual in
all spirits and masterful in all apprehension; and so conceiving himself, he
25
may truly feel and know that he iseternal.
But this ideal immortality, by which a man vainly tries to deceive himself that he is no longer of this world, is imagina24
25

SceptiCism, 271.
George Santayana, Reason in Religion, Chas. Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1905, 272-273.
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tive.

That immortality for which man so ardently

not be so elusive and unsubstantial.

crave~

can

Could the whole human

race be deceived about the fulfillment of this innate desire?
If something so elusive as ideal immortality were the goal of
its longing, mankind would have long ago stifled this desire.
Further proof, if there be need of it, of the other-worldl
character of Santayana's philosophy can be discovered in an investigation of what he has said about God and theology.

It is

well to indicate at the very outset that Santayana disclaims
the name atheist, and resents Fr.
"atheistic esthete".26

~~rtindale's

appellation,

But can Santayana's materialism account

for a God?
"That God is a spirit, though the text be orthodox, has
never been the popular belief, nor have theologians taken it
seriously. ,,27

One might question this sweeping denial.

It is

apparent that Santayana is giving expression to his own stand
on spiritual substances.

Sinoe he considers spirit as a funo-

tion, the "aot" of matter, he recognizes that to be logical he
must reduce God to ma'tter.
grade God?

But would not such a reduction de-

Even Santayana thinks so.28

God to a name.

A name for what?

26 Letter of April 16, 1947.
27 Spirit, 283.
28 Ibid., 288-289.

Then he will reduce

Santayana cushions the blow
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out of his regard for the sensibilities and ratiooinations
•
of the majority of his fellow-men, and states, in his most elegant style, that God is another name for matter.
God then beoomes a poetio symbol for
the maternal tenderness and the paternal striotness of this wonderful world;
the ways of God become the Bubjectmatter of physios. 29
Since matter is the only power in the universe, if men insist
that God, as Creator, is a Power, He can only be another name
for matter.

Men attribute the cosmos to God in the same manner

that they attribute their aotions to their feelings; but in reality it is their material psyohes which are at work.

The dis-

pute, therefore, between theists and atheists is merely
verbal. 30
What is the reaotion of the ordinary Christian who reads
the "General Review" of Realms of Being?

In a glorious summa-

tion Santayana states that his treatment of the realms of being
may be regarded as a reduction of Christian theology and spiritual discipline to their seoret interior souroe.

In the cosmos

man is confronted by an irrationally existing actuality, matter,
which the devout soul, says Santayana, can poetically oall God
the Father, sinoe fram matter all things have their origin.
And God the Son ••• ?
Yet all things, aooording, to the Nioene

29 Matter, 396-397.
30 Spirit, 284.
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Creed, were perforce oreated through the
Son; and this dogma which might seem unintelligible, becomes clear if we consider that power could not possibly produce anything unless it borrowed same
form from the realm of essence and imposed ~hat form on itself and on its
works. 1

.

Thus God the Son is another name for the realm of essence.

vVhen

matter and form fuse and become actual, there arises on occasion
a love and pursuit of the Good.

This third dimension of re-

ality, Which Santayana calls "spirit," is, he claims, poetically
denominated the Holy Ghost. 32
Here again, in theology, Santayana's reader meets the basic
"pre-supposition" of Santayana's philosophy, his materialism.
Embodied in his espousal of chance in preference to a theory of
finality is a refusal to explain God on any but a hypothetical
or pre-suppositional basis.
Yet Santayana himself has rebelled against his own naturalism.

He is a nominal, but not a practicing, Catholic, agreeing,

as he says, with his father and mother in viewing religion as
formally a work of the imagination, a great fairy-tale of the
conscience. 33 What has been Santayana's reaction to this
"fairy-tale?"
For my

31

Olvn

part, I was quite sure that

SEirit, in Realms of Being, 846.
lid., 848.
33 SOliIlpp, ?

32
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life was not worth living; for if religion was false everything was worthless, and almost everything, if religion was true ••• I saw the same alternative between Catholicism and complete
disillusion: but I was never afrai%40f
disillusion, and I have chosen it.

..

Can it be that Santayana is reaping the fruit of his materialism?

None the less he seeks a refuge from this disillusion in

the dream-world of the imagination.

Religion takes on the meaning of having another world to live in. 35 Again, materialism is

lost in the safe harbor of idealism.

Santayana was not, as

Mr. Howgate points out,36 the first to try to find a substitute
for religion in the imagination.

W~tthew

Arnold, Mill, Comte

and others attempted the same thing before him.

These men felt

that religion and poetry supplied the same want, and that the
pure religion of poetry was better calculated to ennoble the
conduct than any belief respecting the unseen powers.

Comte and

Mill styled such a religion a "religion of humanity," and were
firm believers in its effioacy to provide both ample spiritual
satisfaction in this life, and an ideal li:fe of iImnortality in
those who were to :follow them.
Beoause of Santayana's reduction of God and religion to the
realms of myth and fancy,

Fr.

Martindale has branded him an

34 Ibid., 7-8.
35 ruerder-Sears, "How Religion May Be an Embodiment o:f
Reason," 461-464, 461.
36 Howgate, 134.
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"atheistio esthete".

Santayana's atheism stems from his mater~

ialism, for "to ask for an effioient oause, to traoe baok a
foroe or investigate origins, is to have already turned one's
faoe in the direotion of matter and meohanioal laws.,,37

But

this matter is utterly barren for philosophical speoulation,
beoause, as Santayana admits, the universe is an unfinished experiment.
It has no ultimate or~otal nature, beoause it has no end. It embodies no
formula or statable law ••• Vihat a day
may bring forth is unoertain, unoertain
even for God. 38
Faced with this stark irrationality, it is no wonder that
Santayana's philosophy is pictorial.

He can be found on the

brink of despair, on the verge of that intelleotual suioide
which he predicted for himself.

But when he find himself thus

confronting disaster, he completely rejects his materialism to
take refuge in his idealism.
By their mind, its scope, quality, and
temper, we estimate men, for by the
mind-only do we exist as men, and are
more than so many storage-batteries
for material energy. Let us therefore
be frankly human. Let us be content to
live in the mind. 39
Thus the two elements of Santayana's dichotomy, his idealism and materialism, are not integrated to form one philosophy.

37 Muelder-Sears, t~ow Thought is Practical," 458-460, 459.
38 Genteel Tradition, 188.
39 Ibid., 19o.
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His idealism is a harbor from the irrationality of

hi~ma

terialism, while his materialism is posited for sanity's sake
to oounteraot his idealism.

Santayana's own osoillation be-

tween these two elements proves them to be irreoonoilable.

..

CHAPrER V

THE POETIC NATURE OF SANTAYANA'S PHILOSOPHY
This final chapter has as its aim to give an over-all picture of Santayana's philosophy.

In calling attention to the po-

etic nature of this philosophy in the very title of the chapter,
it has not been the intention to convey the idea that Santayana
chooses between the opposing elements of his dichotomy.

In this

respect Santayana is loyal to an ideal he has depicted in one of
his poems: "And he who chooseth not hath chosen best."l But actually Santayana does make a choice, not, however, in. the speculative, but in the practical order.

For Santayana there is no

question of a choice between a materialistic and an idealistic
philosophy.

He considers materialism to be the only philosoph-

ical answer, for "the whole transcendental philosophy, if made
ultimate, is false, and nothing but a private perspective."2
But in the problem of living every-day life, as has been seen in
the previous chapter, the materialistic "pre-supposition of conventional sanity"3 is lost in the glittering splendor of life in
the mind, in the realm of essence.

Undoubtedly this choice in

George Santayana, "In Grantchester Meadows," A Hermit of
carmel! and Other Poems, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York,
1901, 14-115.
2 Egotism in German Philosophy, 167.
3 schi1pp, 17.
1

'13
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practical

li~e,

i~

this life in the mind may be

called~racti

cal,underlies one critic's centering upon "essence" as the keystone of Santayana's philosophy.4 The importance of this
choice of Santayana's can not be over-emphasized.

For to re-

alize'that Santayana is a poet living constantly in the presence of essences, ideal or aesthetic terms, facilitates the
understanding of the otherworldly element

o~

his philosophy.

.

Moreover, though the poet is absorbed in the contemplation
~or.ms,

I

o~

which, as universals, are immutable and'eternal, he re-

alizes that, as a man subject

himsel~

to the winds

o~

change,

who encounters constantly changing and ephemeral objects, he
must exist simultaneously in a

~luid,

material world ••• Even

these perpetually-moving material objects somehow exemplify
eternal essences or characters. 5 Here, once again, Santayana's
materialism and idealism come together and mix, but never gel.
At the root of Santayana's philosophy, in which these two
elements so strangely entwine, is his poetry.

As a philosopher

Se.ntayana enunciates his concept of wisdom, a concept charged
with his poetic genius, in the expression
an apt summation

o~

this thesis.

o~

which can be found

It is wisdom's part "to dream

with one eye open; to be detached fram the world without being

4

5
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hostile to it; to welcome fugitive beauties and pity fygitive
sufferings, without forgetting for a moment how fugitive they
are. n6

The materials of this dream are essences.

But since

Santayana can not completely divorce himself fram common sense,
he keeps "one eye open" on the realm of existence, on the realm.
of matter.
It is disconcerting to discover what little certitude
Santayana wishes to attach to his theories.

First he asserts

that he has
absolute assurance of
the character of some
the rest is arbitrary
pretation added by my
The obvious leaves me

nothing save of
given essence;
belief or interanimal im~ulse.
helpless.

But the philosophical inquirer is even more non-plussed when
he considers the "given essence."
'And all that you yourself have written,
here and elsewhere, about essence, is it
not true?' No, I reply, it is not true,
nor meant to be true. It is a grammaticalor possibly a poetical construction
having, like mathematics or theology, a
certain internal vitality and interest;
but in the direction of truthfinding, such
constructions are merely instrumental like
any language or any telescope. 8
,
It is not surprising, under these circumstances, to find Santayana only too willing to teach detachment: a poetic philosophy

6 Reason in Gommon Sense, 252.
7 soetticism and Anilii801 :Faith, 110.
8 Tru li, 418.
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of escapism from a world which surpasses his comprehension.

He

will fulfill the role of spectator, feeling "that the sphere of
what happens to exist is too alien and accidental to absorb all
the play of a free mind ••• 9 He appropriately describes himself
in an early sonnet:
It is my crown to mock the runner's heat
With gentle wonder and with laughter sweet. 10
During Santayana's years at Harvard his contemporaries had noted
this same tendency, so that Professor James, in a letter recommending Santayana for the chair of philosophy then vacant at
Harvard, could say of him that he was not only a very honest'
and unworldly character, but also "a spectator rather than an
actor by temperament" .11
Naturally this aloofness of spirit left its stamp on Santayana's philosophy.

Essence, matter, truth, and spirit are log-

ical categories, intended to describe a natural dynamic process,
and are actual only in so far as a mind eVolves them. 12 Hence
the pictorial, rather than the analytic, character of Santayana's philosophy.

Santayana's goal for speculation, to absorb

and be absorbed into the truth,13 is redolent of the Indian
philosophies.

Every moment one expects the terms "Brahman or

George Santayana, Winds of Doctrine: ~S..;;.t-iFu:.;.;d.;;;i~e~s~i==n~C..;:;o.;;;n:.;;t~em:=:.a;p..;:;o.;;ra.;;:=.r"'-YI
opinion! Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1913, 24.
10 l01d., 09.
11 Barton, II, 270.
12 Spirit, 277.
13 Reason in Common Sense, 28.
9
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"Nirvana" to express his concept of the highest good of the
spirit, pure intuition. 14

But the detachment of spirit which

Santayana teaches lacks the passivity of Indian detachment; for
Santayana's idea is to enjoy possessions while still being detached from them: to transcend material possessions rather than
despise them. 15
Santayana's philosophy may be a "veracious and fearless
self-expression,,16 beoause its author has utilized his own experience to portray the typical man.

Being a poet, perhaps

Santayana believed that he would strike the deeper ohords of
human nature, so that the introspective man might find his own
soul sketched in Santayana's pages, and experience the joy of
kindred feeling.

Of necessity, then, this pictorial philosophy

seeks no ultimate causes, and consequently is unscientifio.
However much Santayana abhors dogmatizing, he unblushingly
enunciates his own dogmas.

With materialism as the "pre-sup-

'position of conventional sanity,,,17 Santayana's explanation
must repeatedly register nought but "brute facts".

Consequent-

ly, his philosophy becomes more an interpretation than an explanation of these facts.

Can this be the reason for Santa-

yana's preferenoe for the name "esthete,,?18

14 SEirit, 91.
15 lId., 200.
16 Durant, 300.
17 Sohilpp, 17.
18 O'Connor, O.S.M., interviews.

Indeed, he is a

'18

mystical poet, patiently seeking peace in a turbulent

w~r1d.

The woods and the sierras teach him a poetic, not a philosophic,
lesson.
It is no transcendental logic that they
teach; and they give no sign of any deliberate morality seated in the world.
It is rather the vanity and superficiality of all logic, the needlessness of
argument, the relativity of morals, the
strength of time, the fertility of matter,
the variety, the unspeakable variety, of
possible life. Everything is measurable
and conditioned, indefinitely repeated,
yet, in repetition, twisted somewhat from
its old form. Everywhere is beauty, and
nowhere permanence, everywhere is an incipient harmony, nowhere an inteni~on,
nor a responsibility, nor a plan.
Without doubt the world of "transcendental materialism" 1's
a world of chaotic beauty.

It is a biessing for him that

santayana can find refuge from his chaotic world of matter in
the imaginative life of reason, for he has always considered
knowledge tOr be "a part of the imagination in its tenas and in
its seat.,,20

With the terms of knowledge no longer grounded in

the real world, but in the imagination, all becomes for him "a
tale told, if not by an idiot, at least by a dreamer. ,,21 From
the peaceful seclusion of this transcendental dream, Santayana
looks back to the world of matter to chide its ignorance:

o world, thou choosest not the better partt
It is not wisdom to be only wise,
19
20
21

Genteel Tradition, 190.

schJPp, 19-20.

Ibid.
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And on the inward vision close the eyes,
•
But it is wisdom to believe the heart.
Columbus found a world, and had no chart,
Save one that faith deciphered in the skies;
To trust the soul's invincible surmise
Was all his science and his only art.
Our knowledge is a torch of smoky pine
That lights the pathway but one step ahead
Across a void of mystery and dread.
Bid, then, the tender light of faith to shine
By which alone the mortal heart is led
•
Unto the thinking of the thought divine. 22
In this final rejection of materialism for his idealism,
Santayana confirms us in the opinion that these two elements
can not compose a sound, consistent philosophy.

Of itself his

materialism is incapable of explaining the existing world, and
thus matter remains for him "a pre-supposition of conventional
sanity.,,23 As an esthete Santayana transcends his materialism
to live the imaginative life of the realm of essence.

22 Edman, 22.
23 Schilpp, 17.
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APPENDIX I
REPLY TO FATHER MUNSON'S QUESTIONS l
1.

Positions, foundations, or principles may be prejudices-ruling over thought spontaneously and undiscovered---or they
may be ultimate discoveries of inevitable pre-suppositions, on
which an explicit system may be constructed.
Assuming that you mean the latter, I should say that the
logical basis of my mature philosophy was the principle of
identity (qualitative logical possibility or definiteness) in
terms which I call essences. (An essence is only by accident
the essence of a thing, when there happens to be something
that exemplifies that character.

The essence or character it-

self is a mere possibility, a defining term, ideal and nonexistent.

The realm of essence is not limited to the Logos

or morphology of the existing cosmos, as in the Platonists,
but extends over all the "possible worlds" from which Leibniz
says that God must have chosen this one because it was the
best. )
The realm of essence is absolutely infinite and no
1

This "Reply" was written to the author in Mr. Santayana's
own hand. It was received in a letter from Rev. Terence
O'Connor, O.S.M., dated April 16, 1947. This would indicate some time in late March or early April as the probable
date of composition of the "Reply".
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possible essence can be expunged from it.
would require us first to identify it.

To

expun~e

it

But to identify it

would be to assign to it the only reality it claims, i.e.,
its inevitable place among possibles, like the place of any
number among the series of numbers.
Vfllen this inevitable infinity of the possible is understood and the inevitableness of the ideal relations between
essences, involved in the eternal identity of each of them,
something very important becomes evident about any existingworld.

Such a world is inevitably contingent, and need not

have existed.

In other words, everything might just as

easily have been different fram what it is.

The so-called

"laws of nature" do not prevail (if ·and When they do) by any
necessity: they are merely descriptions of observed facts.
As myoId friend Emile Boutroux put it, they are all contingent.

Regularity in nature is neither necessary nor impos-

sible.

How far it extends and what character it has are

questions for science to investigate, not for metaphysics to
decide.
2.

So many points are touched here that I cannot reply
without separating them.
(a) The place of the psyohe in the material world.--Nature advances on a broad front but piecemeal; so that the
movement at each point, though repeating itself if left
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free, is often modified by interference from the neighporing
movements, or even disappears in the melting pot.

Of these

attempted repetitions the most interesting at the level of
human life is heredity.

This involves an extraordinary de-

gree or amount of involution in the seed, so that when suitably planted this seed may expand into all the organs of the
parent body.

The Aristotelian name for such involution is

poutentiality [sic] or existence in potentia.

This

~s

not

mere logical possibility, but-physical potency or dynamism;
and I call it the psyche.

This is an observable biological

cycle or "trope" (as I call it) and the "psychic", in this
sense, must not be confused with the "psychological" or subjective conscious element.

The

material world is therefore

a perfectly discoverable

pl~ce

of the psyche in the
one open

to scientific investigation and capable, I think, of great development both in extension (telepathy, prophecy, communication, etc.) and in depth (psycho-analysis, etc.)
(b)

Place of Spirit in the psyche.--- The reaction of animals

on any stimulus from a distance, like that of plants turning
to the light, is transcendent, i.e., it regards something
which is not the movement of the organ itself, but is a movement of the organ towards an object external to it.

But where

locomotion is pOSSible, the organism affected may move as a
whole towards the source of the stimulus, and even seize or
absorb it.

The transcendence here acquires a subjective
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spiritual accompaniment; it composts perception.

In

~s

sub-

jective or organic sensibility an animal has only feeling or
intuition of something vague and inarticulate; but in his indicative alertness and expectation his perception is transcendent cognitively and is sensation and faith or anticipation.

We

I

then have what is, or aspires to be, knowledge.

The realm of

spirit thus emanates from and overarches the life of matter,
when this becomes self-transcendent.
observe that the field

~pen

[SiC] indefinite in extent.

And it is interesting to

to spirit from the very first in
The essences intuited are seen or

felt against a continuous background, virtually all time and
all existence.

This is the spiritual counterpart of the cosmic

range of all physical tensions, and perfectly natural.
(c)

My "transcendentalism" is not at all transcendent faith in

matter, much less in essence, which latter demands no faith,
but only intuition or definition of ideal or aesthetic terms.
What is "transcendental" in my system is only spirit itself in
its station on this side of the footlights.

Spirit for me is

no substance but only a function of the psyche, when life is
concentrated and synthesized at one point, poetically the
"heart" or "soul," from which all things are surveyed or surveyable.

For itself, consciously, spirit is thus disembodied;

but it has a temporal

a~d

spatial station and point of view,

and endures all the accidents and paSSions of the body: so that
it feels only too much its dependence and captivity there.

But
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that is a one-sided sentiment: more normally, the spirit is the
voice or prayer of the natural man in his physical and social
plights; so that it represents the body morally as well as biologically in the fourth dimension of memory, foresight, and
judgment.
(d)

As to scientific and literary psychology, the distinction

is not meant to separate the compound life which is the object,
but only to remove confusion in the method of treating it theoretically.

English psychology and philosophy rely on subjec-

tive data, which they turn into substances (without using this
honest word): that is literary psychology or autobiography
turned into metaphysics or (as I should call it with the
ancients) into physics.

But to attribute to such ideal data

causal effects, potential existence, or capacity to breed like
rabbits, is superstition.

Subjective data may be SignS of

powers at work; but they are the "insubstantial fabric of a
vision" in their own plane of appearance.
Scientific psychology must be studied in the object, like
medicine, though of course without neglecting the indications
that the tlsubject tt may give of his sensations: since these are
symptoms and signs.

I accept behaviorism in the positive sense

of positing a continuous material process underlying all life:
all appearances and phenomena have organs and substance at work
beneath.

But my study has always been humanistic, not scien-
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tific, and I leave the detail of medicine as of all

p~sics

to

the specialists.
Literary psychology has dramatic and inspirational advantages over scientific psychology.

It evokes feelings and

thoughts which though actuall:· (sicJ bred in the psychologist
or poet, may be literally true of other people's experience.
Physics, on the contrary, never gives literal knowledge, but
only conventional human renderings of non-human events.

r

i

Via Santo Stefano Rotundo, 6,
Rome, June 15, 1947
Dear Father Munson,
Your difficulties in understanding my philosophy do not
surprise me, and I think they are insurmountable so long as you
reason on Scholastic axioms such as nihil dat quod non habet.
Since the "quod" or "quid" is defined as an essence--nothing
existent is'definable--the system of the world becomes entirely a system of essences, and their connectioDSlogical: that
makes the

syste~

meta-physical.

But I have no metaphysics:

essence, truth, and spirit are indeed non-physical; but for
that very reason they are not to be invoked at all in physics
or cosmology, which deals with common sense facts--assumed to
exist by themselves--and studies their factual relations without pretending to explain or understand them.

The perfect in-

nocence of genuine men of science in this respect is admirable
and touching.
Now, I leave all matters of fact to be catalogued in this
unexplained way by the natural sciences: and my epistemology
and psychology are radically and wholly biological, not oon-

I

A letter written in Santayana's own hand in response to the
author's reply to the letter quoted in Appendix I.
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ceptualistic or metaphysical at all.

Naturally they dQ not

meet the requirements of a metaphysical system.
fact do so?

But does any

Are smell, sound, and light impossible data of

sense unless they exist first as such in camphor, bells, and
etherial vibrations?
Yours sincerely,
G. Santayana
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